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k INTRODUCTION 
Bureaucracy. The term is laden with negative connotations. One 
thinks of large, rigidified organizations with baroque, ritualized pro- 
cedures incapable of adapting to changing needs and conditions in the 
environment. In mentioning the term bureaucracy one usually also 
speaks of its means of perpetuation: the professional bureaucrat. These 
are usually cast as unimaginative, plodding individuals socialized into the 
rule system of the bureaucracy to the point where the rules themselves, 
and not the purposes behind the rules, become the reason and guides pf 
their employ. In recent years, another force has appeared which 
threatens to spread the phenomenon of bureaucracy even further, 
namely, the implementation of these bureaucratic rules and procedures 
in the form of computer-based administrative systems. 
The purpose of this paper is to review in somewhat more depth the 
nature and interaction of these three forces: the bureaucratic organiza- 
tion itself; the bureaucrats that populate such organizations; and the spe- 
cial irnpac t of information technology on their operation. 
B. J3UREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS 
The term "bureaucracy," as both a popular and scientific term, has 
come to have a variety of often overlapping definitions. The definition 
used here is due to Weber (1956/19?8). To Weber, the process of bureau- 
cratization is a s h f t  from organizational management based on the 
interests and personalities of specific individuals, to one based on explicit 
d e s  and procedures. These rules and procedures are identified with 
roles in the organization rather than individual people. Bureaucratic 
organizations thus take on an impersonal, mechanical character. To 
Weber, t h s  is a positive development leading to greater effectiveness and 
efficiency: 
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is "dehu- 
manized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, 
and emotional elements which escape calculation (Weber 
1956/19?8:9?5). 
Bureaucracies are sometimes characterized as having a 'mechanis- 
tic,' form of administration based on fixed rules and procedures as 
opposed to 'organic' organizations which rely more on individual discre- 
tion (Burns and Stalker 1961). 
Bureaucracies in t h s  sense are becoming of increasing importance 
in both planned and free market economies though the roles are some- 
what different. 
In a planned economy, the rationalization of management is central 
to the ideology. However, to Marx, bureaucracy was a major evil to be 
abolished: 
Bureaucracy becomes an autonomous and oppressive force 
which is felt by the majority of the people as a mysterious and 
distant entity - as something which, although regulating their 
lives, is beyond their control and comprehension, a sort of divin- 
ity in the face of which one feels helpless and bewildered 
(quoted in Abrahamssonl9?7:38). 
Here the term 'bureaucracy' is used in a slightly different sense from 
Weber, denoting government bureaucracies in particular. The relevance 
for Marx was that these are an important concentration of social power. 
In market economies, bureaucracy seems to be regarded more as a 
concession to inadequacies in market mechanisms. Here we need to dis- 
tinguish bureaucracy from herarchy. Williamson (1973) discusses 'mark- 
ets vs hierarchies' as a problem of economic organization. In certain 
cases resources are allocated via market mechanisms, in other cases 
they are allocated within an organizational hierarcy, which may be under 
either public or private control. Hierarches become bureaucracies (in 
the sense used here) when their administration becomes rationalized, 
embodied in explicit rules. In the case of herarchical organizations in 
the private sector, this rationalization process tends to evolve gradually, 
as the organization discovers regularity in its environment. 
Governmental hierarches, by contrast, are typically created by 
legislation and so become bureaucracies from the outset. Downs 
(1967:32,34) cites a number of factors for the creation of governmental 
hierarcies. One is the case of consumer goods with large 'external' costs 
or benefits. An external cost or benefit is one not reflected in the good's 
free market price - for  instance, the smog created by automobile exhaust, 
or non-biodegradable detergents whch pollute rivers. The point is that 
market mechanisms do not take these external costs into account in 
selecting an equilibrium consumption level. To compensate for these 
inadequacies, a bureaucracy is often created. 
Another case where a free market mechanism does not operate well 
is with so-called 'collective goods.' These are goods with indivisible bene- 
fits; once the good exists, everyone benefits whether or not they have 
paid their share. An example is national defense. In a free market, each 
person is motivated to avoid paying his/her part; since everyone makes 
this assumption, the collective good is not acquired. Again, to avoid this 
pathology of the market system, control of such goods is given over to a 
bureaucracy. 
A somewhat related situation arises in certain industries such as oil 
production or telephone services where economies of scale or patent con- 
trols create strong monopolistic tendencies. In order to protect the con- 
sumer from unfair pricing, two options have been employed, both bureau- 
cratic. One, is to nationalize the entire industry into a governmental 
agency. Examples are PEMEX, Mexico's national oil company and the 
various P'IT's in European countries. The other alternative, effectively 
only slightly different, is to create a governmental regulatory agency to 
control the monopoly's behavior, e.g., the FTC and FCC in the U.S. 
The rationalization of organizations, in itself, would seem to be 
inherently positive and equitable. Indeed, this is the implicit goal behnd 
most of management science and operational research. 
However, there seems to be an undesirable side effect that accounts 
for much of the negative connotations we attach to the term bureau- 
cracy, namely, that highly rationalized organizations apparently become 
inflexible and unresponsive to changes in the environment. Weber com- 
ments: 
Once fully established, bureaucracy is among those social struc- 
ture which are hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy is the means of 
transforming social action into rationally organized action.. . the 
ruled, for their part, cannot dispense with or replace the 
bureaucratic apparatus once it exists, for it rests upon expert 
training, a functional specialization of work, and an attitude set 
on habitual virtuosity in the mastery of single yet methodically 
integrated functions.. .
Such an apparatus makes "revolution," in the sense of forceful 
creation of entirely new formations of authority, more and more 
impossible--technically, because of its control over the modern 
means of communication (telegraph, etc.), and also because of 
its increasingly rationalized inner structure (Weber 
1956/ 1978: 987-989). 
One aspect - at least in market economies -for the unresponsive- 
ness of bureaucracies is that they typically have achieved a monopolistic 
or protected position where they are not forced to change by competitive 
pressures. Nonetheless, newly elected politicians and corporate 
presidents often recognize and attempt to relieve the problem, though 
typically with little success. 
Jay Galbraith (1973, 1977) offers a useful framework for analyzing 
the problem. A currently popular theory of organizations is the informa- 
tion processing view, due principally to Simon (e.g., Simon 1955, March 
and Simon 1958). The key concern is how the organization copes with the 
complezity of its environment, given the bounded rationality (cognitive 
limitations) of its managers. Galbraith extends the information process- 
ing view of organizations, to a 'contingency theory' approach. He regards 
the complexity of the organizations task as only one dimension of its 
information processing difficulties. 
Another dimension is added to the organizational design problem, 
what Galbraith calls uncertain,ty. Ths refers to the degree of unpredicta- 
bility of the tasks performed in the organization: 
Uncertainty is defined as the difference between the amount of 
information required to perform the task and the amount of 
information already possessed by the organization (1973:5). 
The importance of this relates to the organization's ability to plan or 
pre-program its activities: 
The greater the task uncertainty, the greater the amount of 
information that must be processed among decision makers 
during task execution in order to achieve a given level of perfor- 
mance (1973:4). 
Galbraith classifies the nature of the organization's overall cognitive 
task (as well as any of its subtasks) on a two dimensional framework of 
complexity and uncertainty. This may be viewed as a matrix (Figure 1) 
characterizing the different types of cognitive tasks which organizations 
face. In situations of h g h  complexity but low uncertainty, the organiza- 
tion is able to plan and routinize its activities. These are the conditions 
when bureaucracy is most effective. In situations of low complexity and 
high uncertainty, by contrast, the organization is constantly being 
surprised by changes in the environment. Here, the most effective form 
of administration seems to be one that relies heavily on the discretion of 
its employees. Burns and Stalker (196:) use the terms 'mechanical' and 




f igure  1 .  
The problem, of course, is what form of administration is appropriate 
when the environmental demands are both highly complex and highly 
uncertain. 
As observed, rationalization is the typical response to complexity. 
An apparent difficulty with rationalization, however, is that when a once 
stable environment becomes more uncertain, the organization seems to 
have difficulties de-rationalizing, that is, removing rules and procedures 
and relying more on individual discretion in order to become more adap- 
tive. One factor is likely to be that it has reached a level of internal com- 
plexity that cannot be maintained in a less rationalized type of organiza- 
tion. 
The desired response would be to move quickly to another highly 
rationalized configuration. However the complex of bureaucratic pro- 
cedures represents a large scale intellectual effort of many people over 
time. Bureaucracies are  not built in a day. The time required to con- 
struct a new configuration may be too long compared to the rate of 
environmental change. 
Implicit here is the observation that the rationalization of adminis- 
tration and organizational adap tabilitjr s e e m  to be conflicting principles. 
In the next sections we examine possible reasons why. 
C. THE BUREAUCRATIC PERSONALITY 
Seldom are bureaucracies discussed without considering the role 
played by the people who staff them. Weber for instance remarks: 
the professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity in his 
entire economic and ideological existence. In the great majority 
of cases he is only a small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechan- 
ism wh c h  prescribes to him an essentially fixed routine of 
march (Weber 1956/1978:988). 
A bureaucrat, unlike many other vocations, is heavily socialized and 
hence psychologically dependent on his/her active role in the organiza- 
tion. Bureaucracies such as have been described generally only arise in 
large organizations and then usually only after a fairly long period of 
adjustment and stabilization. Thus the activities of a bureaucrat are not 
only explicitly prescribed, but their full extent and interplay with other 
parts of the organization is also complex and difficult to learn. The 
bureaucrat therefore becomes an expert in h s / h e r  role in the par t i cu lar  
organization. 'lhs is for instance quite different from professionals or 
trade workers whose specialities are generally transferable to other 
organizations. 
A bureaucrat's training is thus peculiar to h s  /her organization. This 
makes it unsurprising that  these people cling tenaciously to their posi- 
tions, building defenses and guarding informational resources to make 
their positions more secure. 
Ths ,  I t h n k ,  is one of the primary reasons why bureaucracies are so 
persistent. Indeed, they survive even national revolutions. For instance, 
speahng about the post-revolutionary period in Russia, Lenin complained: 
[During the revolutionary upheavals, the bureaucrats from the 
Tsaristic time had been shaken up and placed in new posts. But 
they did not remain there. They tried to regain their old posi- 
tions.] The Tsarist bureaucrats began to enter the Soviet insti- 
tutions and practice their bureaucratic methods, they began to 
assume the coloring of communists and, for greater success in 
their careers, to procure membership cards of the Russian Com- 
munist Party. And so, having been thrown out of the door, they 
fly in through the window! (Lenin, Selected Works, Vol VIII:353, 
quoted in Abrahamsson 1977:41-42). 
These remarks relate to the complexity and specialization of the 
bureaucrat's training. But the socialization process of the bureaucrat is 
not merely cognitive, it is also epistemic. The bureaucrat does not 
merely understand and obey the organizations rules and procedures, 
(s)he also comes to believe in them with an almost patriotic or religious 
faith. This leads to  a concept of 'organizational myth.' Michael (1977) 
notes that as regards the social/economic world, there are no scientific 
truths. Yet we need some coherent set of beliefs in order to plan and act. 
We need to have 'both feet planted firmly in mid-air.' An important 
aspect of a successful organization is to provide a certain pblosophy or 
set of 'myths' which provide social unity and focus. 
Deal and Kennedy (1982) propose a similar concept in what they call 
'corporate culture,' which they regard as a major factor in the success of 
such giants as Westinghouse, General Electric, IBM, and 'Japan, Inc.' The 
concept of corporate culture is an  enthusiastic one. It has something of 
the flavor of a large scale football rally, complete with mottos such as 
'progress is our most important product' (General Electric), 'bet ter  
things for better living through chemistry' (Du Pont), and so on. The 
image is on of growth, innovation, aggressive and spirited competition. 
Peters (1980) arrives a t  a similar view in h s  remarks about building 
'organizational character.' 
Bureaucracies, by contrast, have typically reached a stage where 
further growth and innovation are limited. The emphasis is rather on sta- 
bility, correctness, and control. Bureaucratic commandments are 
intoned, "Thou shalt not ...." Aspiration and inspiration are tempered by 
the guilt of transgression. Tbs  results in what Thompson (1961) calls the 
'bureaupatkc reaction' where, 
strict control from above encourages employees to 'go by the 
book,' to avoid innovations and chances of errors whch put 
black marks on the record. It encourages the accumulation of 
records to prove compliance ... It encourages decision by pre- 
cedent, and unwillingness to exercise initiative or take a chance. 
I t  encourages employees to wait for orders and do only what 
they are told (Hampton 1978:365). 
However, egocentric drives are not always so much suppressed as 
diverted. Trotsky, for instance, observed: 
Bureaucracy owns neither shares nor state bonds. It is 
recruited, replenished, and renewed as an administrative he r a r -  
chy, independently of property relationships. The individual 
bureaucrat cannot transfer the right to exploit the state 
apparatus to his heirs. Bureaucracy enjoys its privileges in the 
form of power abuse (Trotsky, The R e v o l u t i o n  Betrayed, pp. 
179-180; quoted in Abrahamsson, 1977:46). 
Tks  last observation is interesting in light of the remarks by Weber 
earlier. Weber views the process of bureaucratization as tending towards 
operations based on impartial rules and procedures rather than personal- 
ities and personal motives. 
But, as the Trotsky quote suggests, one of the pathologies of mature 
bureaucracies is practically the reverse. Because bureaucrats become so 
wedded to their roles, they not only depend on them psychologically but 
also may tend to  re-interpret them to satisfy their own personal ends. It 
is perhaps in reaction to the inflexibility of the bureaucratic structure 
that certain aged bureaucracies tend to develop a side market of graft 
and favoritism. 
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN BUREAUCRACIES 
Bureaucrats are no longer the only active force in bureaucracies. 
Whereas a bureaucrat is trained and socialized to follow prescribed pro- 
cedures, a computer can likewise be programmed to follow many of these 
same procedures. 
Indeed, the computerization of a bureaucratic process is the ulti- 
mate form of organizational rationalization. The computer is the arche- 
type of Weber's dictum to  eliminate "love, hatred and all purely personal, 
irrational and emotional elements" from the orga.nization's procedures. 
Yet while computers presumably help remove the undesirable 
caprice of bureaucrats themselves, they nonetheless have become sym- 
bols of pathological bureaucratic rigidity. We are all acquainted with the 
agonies of trying to rectify a computer based billing error, etc. 
But is t h s  really because the computerization of such process actu- 
ally makes them less adaptive, or is it rather that  computers provide a 
convenient scapegoat for organizational incompetence? Systems analysts 
will often argue that  the latter is the case. While t h s  may be partially 
true, it is also true that  computerization, a t  least in its most prevalent 
forms, does add to inflexibility. Ths  stems from two interrelated prob- 
le ms. 
The first is one of organizational responsibility: The people that use 
the computer programs are very seldom the ones that write them. Thus 
the people that are close to the problem and able to recognize needed 
modifications as they arise, must request the assistance of a program- 
mer,  who typically resides in a different (data processing) department. 
This problem has been widely recognized and is oft cited as a motivation 
for localized (microprocessor) computing and associated high level 
languages that the functional departments themselves can control; see 
e.g. Fick (1980). However, t h s  is likely to be only a partial solution, 
applicable only to those procedures that are modular and separable to 
individual departments. The problem still would remain as to the 
management of procedures that pervade large segments of the organiza- 
tion, especially where these are complex and interdependent. 
E. DIFFZCULTIES IN s o m m  ADAPTATION 
A second source of inflexibility arising from computerization arises, 
from the character of the computer languages used to describe these 
procedures (Lee 1980a). 
Anyone who has written even small programs will know that it is 
much easier to incorporate a given feature in the program logic in its ori- 
ginal writing rather than t ry  to add this feature afterwards. This diffi- 
culty rises exponentially with the complexity of the original program or 
system. (By 'system,' is meant a collection of programs and data files 
with interdependent functions .) Indeed, the cost and effort of modifying 
such systems often exceeds that of their original development. For 
instance, Wulf (1977) refers to: 
the extreme difficulty encountered in attempting to modify an 
existing program. Even though we frequently believe that we 
know what we will want a piece of software to do and will be able 
to specify it precisely, it seems to be invariably true that after 
we have it we know better and would like to change it. Examina- 
tion of the history of almost every major software system shows 
that so long as it is used it is being modified! Evolution stops 
only when the system is dead. The cost of such evolution is 
almost never measured, but, in at  least one case, it exceeded 
the original development cost by a factor of 100. 
Altering existing computer systems is not only expensive, it is also risky. 
DeMillo et  al. (1979) noted: 
Every programmer knows that altering a line or sometimes even 
a bit can utterly destroy a program or mutilate it in ways we do 
not understand and cannot predict ... 
Indeed, beyond expense and risk, there seems to be an eventual limit to 
the number of modifications these systems can undergo. Winograd 
(19?9:392) remarks 
Using current programming techniques, systems often reach a 
point a t  which the accretion of changes makes their structure 
so baroque and opaque that further changes are impossible, and 
the performance of the system is irreversibly degraded. 
To summarize, the basic problem with current application systems is 
that they are 'brittle;' i.e., they cannot easily be reformed to adapt to 
changing circumstances. This brittleness has profoundly disturbing 
consequences as more and more organizations, ranging from small and 
medium size companies to immense governmental agencies, convert 
their information processing to computer software. The immediate gains 
of increased efficiency, speed of processing, rapid access to centralized 
data files, etc., are clear (or the investment would not be justified). 
However, there may be a long term, possibly devastating htdden cost 
as the organization finds its ability to adapt and respond to new environ- 
mental conditions hampered by its inability to modify its information sys- 
tems accordingly. 
F. THE PROBLEM WlTH PROGRAMS: 
PROCEDURAL LANGUAGES YS. PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 
Statements in a programming language are in the form of com-  
m a n d s  to the machine -i.e., add t h s ,  move this data from here to there, 
print this on the terminal, etc. 
A computer program is thus a sequence of such statements, e.g., 
10 LETX = 2 
20 LETY = 3 
30 LETZ = X  + Y  
40 PRINT Z 
Here, the statements have been numbered for identification pur- 
poses. Importantly, the ordering of the statements in this program indi- 
cates the sequence in which the commands are to be performed by the 
machine . 
This otherwise linear sequence of execution can be modified by what 
are called 'control statements'. Consider, for instance, the program: 
10 LETX = 0 
20 ADD 1 TO X 
30 PRINT X 
40 IFX = 100 GO TO 60 
50 GO TO 20 
60 STOP 
When executed, this program prints the numbers from 1 to 100. 
Here, statements 40 and 50 are control statements. In statement 40, if X 
has reached 100, program control jumps to statement 60 where it stops. 
Otherwise, statement 50 directs the program control back to statement 
20 where X is again incremented, printed, etc. 
Thus, the execution sequence in such computer programs normally 
follows the top to bottom ordering of the statements, except when super- 
ceded by the effects of control statements. Computer languages of this 
type are called procedural. These are basically the only type used in 
commercial practice, and include all the well known languages for data 
processing and scientific applications - e.g., COBOL, FORTRAN, PL/I, 
BASIC, ALGOL, etc. 
In these cases, the 'knowledge' embodied in the computer program 
is expressed as the specific steps for doing it. A key thing to recognize is 
that this procedurality makes the statements of the program inter- 
dependent. Generally (though not always) changing the order of any two 
statements makes a serious change to the program's operation. While it 
may not be patently obvious from the two tiny examples above, it is this 
inter-dependence that makes computer programs so difficult to modify. 
As a result of an interesting blend of computer science and formal 
linguistics, an alternative approach has emerged over the last decade or 
so. l h s  approach is based on so-called 'production systems' (PS's) which 
permit the knowledge of the program to be expressed in a form that is 
independent of its execution sequence. 
The concept of production systems was first proposed by the linguist 
Post in 1943 to aid in the formal specification of natural language gram- 
mars. The basic idea is extremely simple. A single production is a rule of 
the form: 
IF <pattern> THEN <action> 
or, in the more usual notation, 
A production system consists of a 'data base' and a collection of such 
production rules. (This is a database in a fairly restricted sense, not to 
be confused with those maintained by database management systems.) 
The pattern in each rule is some condition to be matctad by the 
database and the action is typically some modification to the database. 
In the 'purest' form of a production system, the rules are arranged in a 
linear order. Starting from the beginning the patterns are compared to 
the database until a successful match is found. The corresponding action 
is then performed and the process is then repeated, starting once again 
from the beginning comparing the patterns to the database. 
Consider for instance the following example for recognizing a certain 
type of English declarative sentence. 
1 THE - DET 8 N NP 
2 ON 4 PREP 9 ADJNP 4 NP 
3 HUNGRY 4 ADJ 10 DETNP r, NP 
4 BIT 4 VT 11 PREP NP PP 
5 DOG 4 N 12 VTNP 4 VP 
6 CAT 4 N 13 VPPP 4 VP 
7 NECK 4 N 14 NP VP 4 S 
The production rules on the left represent a 'lexicon' indicating the 
grammatical categories of various words. The rules on the right indicate 
the grammar proper. When the terminal symbol "S" is reached, the sen- 
tence is accepted as grammatical. Thus, suppose we have the following 
sentence: 
"The hungry dog bit the cat on the neck." 
This is analyzed as follows: 
DET ADJ N VT DET N PREP DET N Rules 1-7 
DET ADJ NP VT DET NP PREP DET NP 3 x rule 8 
DETNPVTDETNPPREPDETNP 1 x rule 9 
NP VT NP PREP NP 3 x'rule 10 
NP VT NP PP 1 x rule 11 
N P W P P  1 x rule 13 
S 1 x rule 14 
The initial application of production systems in computer science 
were in the area of compiler theory, i.e., in specifying the syntax and 
interpretation of programming languages (as opposed to natural 
languages). Subsequently, it has been recognized that  PS's have a poten- 
tial much broader range of usefulness. For instance, one classic applica- 
tion was the Logical Theorist of Newell, Shaw and Simon (1963). Beginning 
with the initial axioms and rules of inference of Russell and Whitehead's 
Principu Mathematics, the Logical Theorist successfully proved all the 
theorems of t h s  massive text. Indeed, in several cases it found original 
proofs, simpler than the original. 
Another famous example of the use of production systems was 
Shortliffe's MYCIN system (1976). The purpose of MYCIN is to perform 
medical diagnosis. In this case, the database is the patient's symptoms, 
as revealed by various laboratory tests,  etc. The production rules are 
thus the sort of medical deductions a doctor might make based on these 
symptoms. Within the area of Artificial Intelligence (AI) numerous other 
applications of production systems have been explored. 
Davis and King (1975), an excellent survey article on production sys- 
tems, comment on the types of applications where PS's are best suited: 
[These are] where the emphasis of a task is on recognition of 
large numbers of distinct states, PS's provide a n  advantage. In 
a procedurally-oriented approach, it is both difficult to organize 
and troublesome to update the repeated checking of large 
numbers of state variables and the corresponding transfers of 
control. .. . 
[PS's are] characterized by the principle that  'any rule can fire 
a t  any time,' which emphasizes the fact that  at any point in the 
computation, any rule could possibly be the next to  be selected, 
depending only on the state of the database at  the end of the 
current cycle. Compare this to the normal situation in a pro- 
cedurally oriented language, where such a principal is mani- 
festly untrue: it is simply not the  case that,  depending on the 
contents of the database, any procedure in the entire program 
could potentially be the next to be invoked. 
PS's therefore appear to be useful where it is important to 
detect and deal with a large number of independent states, in a 
system which requires a broad scope of attention and the capa- 
bility of reacting to small changes. 
With regard to the ease of modification of PS's, they continue (p.20): 
We can regard the modular i ty  of a program as the degree of 
separation of its functional units into isolatable pieces. A pro- 
gram is highly r n o d u l a ~  if any functional unit can be changed 
(added, deleted, or replaced) with no unanticipated change to 
other functional units. Thus program modularity is inversely 
related to the strength of coupling between its functional units. 
The modularity of programs written as pure production systems 
arises from the important fact that the next rule to be invoked 
is determined solely by the contents of the database, and no 
rule is ever called directly. Thus the addition (or deletion) of a 
rule does not require the modification of any other rule to pro- 
vide for (delete) a call to it. We might demonstrate this by 
repeatedly removing rules from a PS: many systems will con- 
tinue to display some sort of 'reasonable' behavior, up to a 
point. By contrast, adding a procedure to an ALGOL-like pro- 
gram requires modification of other parts of the code to insure 
that i t  is invoked, while removing an arbitrary procedure from 
such a program will generally cripple it.. . 
Thus where the ALGOL programmer carefully chooses the order 
of procedure calls to create a selected sequence of environ- 
ments, in a production system it is the environment which 
chooses the next rule for execution. And since a rule can only 
be chosen if its criteria of relevance have been met,  the choice 
will continue to be a plausible one, and system behavior remain 
'reasonable,' even as rules are successively deleted. 
As described so far, pat tern matching proceeds from the beginning 
of the rule set each time until a match is found, in which case that 
corresponding action is taken and the process is repeated. However, in 
the notion of a 'pure' PS, each rule supposedly has an equal chance of fir- 
ing - i.e., its position in the rule set should not affect its chances of fir- 
ing. This only causes difficulty when the patterns of more than one rule 
match the database, in which case a choice must be made which action to 
take. A variety of approaches have been used to resolve such rule con- 
tention, for instance: 
rule order - use the first matching rule. 
data order - data elements are assigned priority: pick the 
rule whose match gives the highest priority. 
generality order - use the most specific rule 
recency order - use the most recently executed rule 
Recall that each rule is matched against the entire database and 
that two simultaneously activated rules may have matches on completely 
separate parts of the database. Clearly, rule contention is only prob- 
lematic when the firing of one rule would disable the database match of 
the other candidate rule(s). 
Thus, in the 'pure' form of a FS, all of the rules should be tested 
against the database on each cycle, the subset of matching rules 
selected, and a choice made (by some criterion) whch of those should be 
allowed to  fire. However, as the database and/or number of rules gets 
large, the system degrades for lack of efficiency. 
In face of t h s ,  a number of production system implementations have 
allowed some degree of control structure to creep back in. Thus, various 
strategies or 'heuristics' have been employed to increase the likelihood 
that,  for certain contexts, the applicable rules will be found quickly and 
that the entire rule set need not be examined without danger of ignoring 
an applicable rule. 
Thus, a number of PS implementations exhibit a greater or lesser 
degree of 'partial procedurality' as production systems augmented with a 
control structure mechanism. The design of such control structures, pro- 
viding efficient search without nullifying the advantages of flexibility 
offered by the basic PS orientation, has become a matter of intense 
interest end debate within computer science (see, e.g., Winograd 1975; 
Kowalski 1979b). 
G. THE PROBLEM WITH DATA: 
DATA FILES VS PREDICATE CALCULUS 
Most application software used in organization centers around the 
processing of large amounts of data (as opposed to, for instance, optimi- 
zation routines whch are much more computation intensive on relatively 
small amounts of data). Hence, inflexibilities introduced by the way data 
is organized in data files and databases are equally (if not more) impor- 
tant than those introduced in the design of procedural programs. At any 
rate, as will be seen shortly, the problems are highly inter-related. 
A note on terminology. In the last section, the term database was 
used to designate the data repository of a production system. In t h s  sec- 
tion, the term database will be used more in the sense associated with 
database management (DM). Somewhat later we return to compare the 
two views at  whch point they will be distinguished as PS databases and 
DM databases. 
For the moment, however, we focus on a genera l  view of data main- 
tained in data processing applications, whether this data is accessed 
through a database management system or not. The term 'data file' is 
therefore used to indicate a conventional data processing file or a logical 
segment of a database (e.g., the tuples of a single relation in a relational 
database; the instances of a single record type in a CODASYL database). 
The term 'database' will then be used to refer to a collection of such data 
files with inter-related subject matter (e.g., sales file, inventory file, 
back-order file), whether or not the access to these is coordinated by a 
DBMS. 
Data files are usually organized as a rectangular table with labeled 
columns called 'fields.' For instance, a file on employees might have 
fields for the employee's name, address, age, salary, etc. 
EMPLOYEE FILE 
Sometimes data files have more complicated organizations - e.g., 
some columns may have multiple entries for a given data item. This tabu- 
lar view is sufficient for the purposes here, however. As Kent (1978) 
observes, this is essentially the view taken by the more popular database 
management models (i.e., Network, Relational). 
Note that each data file has three levels of description: the data file 
name (erg., EMPLOYEE), the field names (e.g., NAME, AGE), and the data 
values (e.g., Smith, 37). It is important to note also that a data file 
represents a model  of some aspect of the organization, in t h s  case, what 
are considered to be the important features of employees. 
The structure of the data file often carries certain implicit informa- 
tion as well. Often, as in t h s  example, each row of the data file implies 
the existence of some entity in the environment, in this case a n  employee 
associated with the company. The converse assumption is also some- 
times made, e.g., if a person's name does not appear in the file, then 
he/she is not an employee. 
Other data files, however, might have different existence assump- 
tions. Consider for instance a file for parts inventories. 
PART FILE 
This file indicates the identification number (ID#), color, weight (WT) and 
quantity (QTY) on hand of various manufactured parts. In this case, each 
row of the file does not imply the existence of a part, but only elaborates 
the features of each generic part type. The existence of actual parts is 
instead indicated by the QTY field. 
These might be called the existential assumptions associated with a 
file. Other assumptions refer to the possible data values that may appear 
in a given field, e.g., that SALARY must be less than 50,000. 
The basic point, however, is that the data file structure itself is not 
sufficient to convey all these assumptions. Instead, these appear in the 
logic of the programs that interpret these data files. Thus, the model of 
the organization represented in the application system is found not only 
in the data files but also in the code of the various application programs. 
This is a problem that has been recognized for some time in database 
management, and has led to a number of proposals for the separate 
specification of so called 'data base constraints,' conditions that the data 
in the database must always fulfill. Such constraints are maintained in a 
separate table, and verified by each updating program. However, these 
approaches do not go far enough. There is a basic problem that  remains, 
which has to do with the very notion of 'data'  itself. 
In all data processing files and database management systems, 
there is a distinction between d a t a  s t r u c t u r e  and the data itself. What we 
have called the data file names and field names are examples of data 
structure elements. Thus, for instance, in the above data file for parts, 
we have in the first row: COLOR = "RED" where the three character string 
"RED" is the value ot the field COLOR. The point is that these data values 
are regarded as s t r i n g s  of charac t e r s  r a t h e r  t h a n  as proper t i e s  of objects  
in t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t .  Viewed only as character strings, one is unable to 
specify even very commonplace inter-relationshps between these proper- 
ties; tor instance, that if a thing has a color, it must be a physical object, 
hence, having weight, physical extension, geographical location, etc. 
The basic problem is that the variables in data management models 
range over sets of charac t e r  s t r i n g s  (so-called 'attribute domains' in the 
relational model), rather than over objects  in the environment. For 
instance, a database constraint that all parts are either red, blue or white 
would look somethng like: 
PART.COLOR = "RED" OR "BLUE" OR "WHITE" 
To recognize that  these are properties of objects in the environment, a 
predicate calculus notation might be used, introducing the variable x to 
range over these objects: 
1. Vx PART (x) 4 RED (x) OR BLUE (x) OR WHITE (x) 
(the symbol "'d" is read "for all"). The point is that in this form, one can 
begin to elaborate more general properties, i.e., not just of parts, but of 
anything that  has a color. 
2. Vx RED (x) OR ORANGE (x) OR YELLOW (x) OR GREEN (x) 
OR ... OR BLACK (x) - COLORED (x) 
3. Vx COLORED (x) --r PHYSICAL-OBJECT (x) 
4. Vx PHYSICAL-OBJECT (x) --r I n  n > 0 & WEIGHT (x) = n .  
(the symbol "3" is read "there exists"). 
Statement (2) is a disjunct of all color names used in the organiza- 
tion, indicated that  any of these implies the general feature of being 
colored, and vice versa, that  being colored implies one of these proper- 
ties. Statement (3) says that anything that is colored is also a physical 
object (though some physical objects - e.g.,  glass, mirrors -may not be 
colored). Statement (4) says that  for any physical object there exists 
some positive number that  is its weight (presuming some unit of weight 
measure). 
The direction intended by t h s  example should begin to become 
clear. Clearly there a re  many commonplace connections between pro- 
perties that  any organization would agree upon - e.g., the simple physics 
of colors, weights, physical extent, etc. These rules will hold for any phy- 
sical object, from peanuts to box cars. Other classes of properties might 
be restricted to a particular social system -e.g., the number of spouses 
an  employee might have, whether dual nationalities are recognized. 
Other classes of properties pertain to specific industries within a given 
social system - e.g., the accounting practices for banks vs, those for edu- 
cational institutions. Lastly, there are clearly those properties that are 
organization specific, such as the ranks of personnel or the parts  it 
manufactures. 
Ideally, the inter-relationship of properties a t  any one of these levels 
should only have to be developed once -e.g.,  commonplace physics by a 
national or world wide bureau of standards, accounting practices by a n  
industry accounting board, etc. Then, the task of any particular organi- 
zation in developing its application software would only be to specify the 
d i f l e r e n c e s  of its local practice from that of the standardized models. 
The proposal here is, therefore, to offer a predicate calculus (PC) 
notation as a replacement for the usual data structure view with the 
claim that  it provides a richer framework, capable of specifying the 
inter-dependence of properties of objects, not just structured organiza- 
tions of character strings. Related work on the relationshp between 
databases and logic appears in the (Gallaire and Minker 1978, Gallaire e t  
al. 1981). 
I t  should be mentioned that this is not necessarily a recommenda- 
tion that facts about the environment actually be s to red  in t h s  form - 
the underlying implementation might actually make use of a more con- 
ventional data management model -but rather that  the top-most level  or 
v i e w  of the database have the PC form. 
It should also be mentioned that  a predicate calculus notation is not 
the only candidate to meet  the objectives of abstracting the relationships 
of general properties. The various graphical representations called 
'semantic' or  'associative' network also share this goal. However, the 
predicate calculus has had a longer history of development and study 
and, in our opinion a t  least, is a more robust representation. The predi- 
cate calculus is, however, only a f r a m e w o r k ,  a meta-theory in w h c h  
more detailed theories can be described. 
It can, for instance, be used to describe theories of mathematics, in 
which case the variables would range over numbers, or theories in chem- 
istry, where the variables would range over the physical elements. Thus, 
the real work in pursuing this proposed direction would be to develop a 
predicate calculus specialized to the problems of administration. This 
involves, among other things, identifying a set of 'primitive' properties 
and relationships (i.e., single, multi-place predicates) w h c h  identify spe- 
cial classes of entities like people, other physical objects, money, types of 
contracts, etc.* 
* An initial attempt in t h s  direction was made in Lee (1980), which developed a predicate 
calculus notation, called CANDID, for the description of financial contracts, e.g., loans, 
leases, options, insurance policies, etc. A formal semantics of CANDID, leading to a contrac- 
tual theory of the firm, is developed in Lee (1981a, b). 
H. COMBINING THE APPROACHES: LOGIC PROGRAXNING 
The point of the previous section was to recommend a predicate cal- 
culus notation as a richer form of data representation. In section [F], 
production systems were suggested as a more flexible framework for 
specifying the potential deductions of an  application system. An 
approach wh ch  combines these aspects is so-called 'logic programming' 
of which the language PROLOG is an example (Clocksin and Mellish 1981, 
Kowalski 1979a). 
Actually, production systems acting upon predicate calculus data- 
bases have been in experimental use for some time withn the computer 
science area of artificial intelligence (AI). (See e.g. ,  Nilsson 1980, 
Infotech 1981). Systems with t h s  design are usually called 'theorem 
provers,' in that the function of the production system is to prove some 
'goal' theorem, based on a set of initial axioms in the database. The 
term, 'theorem proving,' is not, however, confined to simply proving 
mathematical theorems. As noted in the previous section, the predicate 
calculus may be used to represent a wide variety of subject domains 
beyond mathematics. Coelho e t  al. (1980) includes examples of applica- 
tions of logic programming in demography, university administration, 
biblical family trees, car rallies, biology, electronics parts, travel plan- 
ning, architectural design, and others. 
Very briefly, the basic concept of logic programming is as follows. 
The classical proof methods for (first order) predicate calculus include a 
wide number of iderence rules (e.g., Suppes !957:34, 99) These make 
computational theorem proving difficult because the space of possibilities 
quickly branches into an exponentially large number of alternatives. 
Robinson ( 1965) developed the so-called 'resolution method' whch 
offered equivalent logical power but considerable computational simpli- 
city. This advantage is gained by assuming a syntactic transformation of 
the logical assertions into 'Horn clauses' of the form: 
where Pi are predicates whose arguments are either logical constants or 
universally quantified variables. (Nilsson, (1980: Ch.4) and Clocksin and 
Mellish (lQ81:Ch. 10) show how arbitrary p redca te  calculus expressions 
can be converted to Horn clause form.) Once in this form, only one infer- 
ence rule, resolution, is needed. This rule basically combines the rules of 
modus ponens and universal instantiation (unification). 
The control structure that is then employed is similar to that  dis- 
cussed for production systems above. However, whereas the PS method 
was typically to proceed 'forward' from a starting database to the desired 
conclusion, logic programming designs generally proceed 'backward' 
from a goal statement to the basic assertions which support i t .  Thus, the 
Horn clauses are often read, "if you want to prove Po then prove PI and P2 
and ... P,." The system then looks for other rules which have PI on the 
left hand side (called the head of the clause), and attempts to prove PI.  
This approach continues recursively until unconditional assertions of the 
form: 
are found. The proof procedure therefore takes the form of a tree struc- 
ture, proceeding from the goal theorem through the various theorems 
supporting this goal until lowest level fact assertions are found. 
Disjunction ('OR') is indicated by having multiple Horn clauses with 
the same head. Thus, if a proof is not found through the branch 
represented by one Horn clause, the system 'backtracks' to try other 
Horn clauses with the same head predicate until all alternatives have 
been exhausted. (If no proof is found, then the system response is ' I  don't 
know.') 
An advantage of this type of software architecture is that it allows 
the specification of so-called 'heuristics,' i.e., a number of overlapping 
rules for a given situation, which may be more or less effective depending 
on situational variations. Thus, for instance, a computer program con- 
fronted with a particular problem may try to  resolve it using one set of 
heuristic rules; if those do not work, other rules are tried, etc. 
In such systems, there may in fact be multiple ways to solve a given 
problem (or none a t  all); and it is the job of the program to find a satis- 
factory solution as quickly as possible. Because the program must search 
through a number of potentially feasible alternatives for each problem, 
rather than having a single solution technique pre-selected, these sys- 
tems are considerably less efficient, though correspondingly more flexi- 
ble in dealing with highly varied situations. For t h s  reason, application 
programs using these methods are often called 'expert systems.' 
I. THE SEMANTIC PROBLEM 
Aside from software adaptability considerations, another effect of 
representing information systems as a formal logic is to clarify and focus 
certain linguistic issues. 
Regarded as a logical processor, the role of the information system 
in the organization can be viewed as a linguistic mediator between 
members of the organization separated geographically and temporally. 
However, the information system has an important function not pro- 
vided by other communications technologies such as memos, the tele- 
phone or electronic mail. The information system not only conveys mes- 
sages in the form they are  entered, but it may also do inferences on the 
facts in the database. Database queries are an  elementary form of infer- 
ence. More sophsticated inferences are provided by routines producing 
summary data and other statistical or mathematical analyses. 
In order to draw inferences, the facts must be structured or formal- 
ized. This is a basic activity in database design. Viewed abstractly, this 
amounts to expressing these facts in a formal Language. A formal 
language is one controlled by fixed, explicit rules, typically including the 
following (van Fraassen 1971): 
I. Syntactic Rules 
A. Vocabulary 
B. Formation Rules (delimiting well-formed expressions) 
C. Transformation Rules (providing inferences) 
11. Semantic Rules. 
A formal language contrasts with a natural language in that the 
latter is controlled by the (evolving) consensus of its speaker population, 
rather than by fixed rules. Note that by this definition, the difference 
between formal and natural languages is one of authority rather than 
complexity. Formal languages might someday be invented which are 
more complex than natural languages, either syntactically or semanti- 
cally. Note also that so-called 'natural language' interfaces to databases 
are also formal languages by this definition. 
In using the information system, individuals channel certain of their 
communications through t h s  formal language. Of particular importance 
is the semantics of these communications, that  is, how the formal expres- 
sions correspond to the environmental reality. 
The foundational work in formal semantics is by Tarski (i956), who 
focused almost entirely on first-order predicate calculi of the type 
described above. Tarski regarded semantics as a mapping from symbols, 
expressions in the language to objects in the world. An immediate prob- 
lem is that in describing the semantics of a language, we generally cannot 
physically point to all the objects we wish to designate. Tarski's approach 
was to make use of another, 'meta-language' for this purpose. The meta- 
language he adopted was set  theory, and nearly all the subsequent work 
in formal semantics has followed this precedent. 
The semantics of a first order language, L,  begins by adopting some 
universal set  called the 'domain of individuals', D. A function F, called the 
interpretation function, maps expressions in L to set theoretic expres- 
sions based on D. Logical constants (names) in L map to individual ele- 
ments of D; one-place predicates map to subsets of D; n-place predicates 
map to relations on D, and so on. 
Tarski called the combination <D,F> a mode l  of L (not to be confused 
with the operational research usage of 'model'; a more familiar term 
might be an inte .rpretat ion of L). Clearly, a given language L can have any 
number of models (interpretations). This led Tarski to the distinction 
between synthetic truths, which are true only under certain models 
(interpretations) vs analytic or logical truths whch are true for all possi- 
ble models. For example, 
a )  Vx LEMON(x) -+ FRUIT(x) 
b) Vx P(x) V "P(x) 
Statement a) is true only for certain interpretations of LEMON and FRUIT 
whereas b) is true for any interpretation of P. 
In information system applications we are mainly concerned with 
truths of the first (synthetic) type. The truth of these inferences thus 
depends on the semantics we at tach to these terms. For instance if we 
interpret FRUIT as the set  of all fruit but LEMON as the set  of all 
elephants, then the  above implication is false (in t h s  model). 
In formal languages, then, semantics is parametric. This is quite dif- 
ferent from the way we understand our natural language (e.g., English). 
In natural language we grow accustomed to a rather fixed, ongoing 
interpretation to our words. 
It is largely by association with natural language terms that the 
expressions conveyed by the information system have a semantics to the 
users in the organization. For instance, a database may use terms like 
EMPLOYEE, SALARY, DEPARTMENT, etc. and we interpret them using their 
natural language correspondents. 
But here we confront a basic problem raised by the distinction 
between formal and natural languages. The semantics of natural 
languages is not entirely fixed. The sorts of thngs  we call 'automobile,' 
for example, are quite different today than fifty years ago. And the 
interpretation continues to change as each year new automobile designs 
come into the market. Indeed, it is in the area of social artifacts - 
economic goods and services -where linguistic change is most rapid. 
(Tbs contrasts with terms for natural phenomena, e.g., horses, moun- 
tains, water, which change more slowly. Social/economic evolution is 
more rapid than biological or geological evolution.) 
On the other hand, the inferences drawn by an information system 
depend on a fixed, static semantics for their validity. The potential con- 
trib utions of logic programming and other artificial intelligence innova- 
tions will not alter this situation. 
The linguist Whorf (1956) is often cited for h s  observations about the 
inter-dependence of language and culture. For example, Eskimos have 
more than a dozen words for snow each of which reflects an important 
technological distinction in their culture (e.g., good for igloo building, bad 
for dog sleds, etc.). The Hopi Indians do not have a word corresponding to 
the English 'time,' nor do their verb tenses make the temporal distinc- 
tions between past, present, and future. Thls is a reflection of their reli- 
gious and metaphysical beliefs. 
Less fascinating but equally important examples abound on the 
inter-dependence between organizational language and organizational 
culture (e.g., Kent 1978, Peters 1980). Obvious examples are the names 
assigned to product lines and specialized, in-house technology. Countless 
more subtle examples are  found in the administrative terminology found 
in managerial accounting reports, memos, 'shop talk,' office gossip, etc. 
Thus an organization, to  adapt to environmental changes, must also adapt 
its language, either by introducing ne-w terms or by changing the 
interpretation of existing terms. 
If the information system is to keep pace with this change, infer- 
ences which depend on the evolving terminology will have to be 
correspondingly modified. Tbs  presents another important trade-off for 
the use of information technology in dynamic organizations. 
However, strong arguments can be made that  these systems will 
neuer be able to adapt themselves. 
Putnam (1970, 1978) gives a very persuasive account in what might 
be regarded as a sociological theory of semantics. Consider my 
knowledge of the concept 'lemon.' I am not much of a cook, so my under- 
standing is fairly rudimentary. I cannot, for instance, distinguish lemons 
from yellow limes (if such thngs  exist). But, on the other hand, I do hav- 
ing a working concept that suffices for my needs. I go to the super- 
market. Since I know that lemons are a subset of fruit, I go to the fruit 
section. There, typically, are bins one of which is labeled 'lemons,' and I 
pick from that.  (If they are not labeled, 1 use the heuristic of picking the 
yellow, oval-shaped objects somewhat smaller than my fist. But then I 
may end up with yellow limes of course.) 
But how does the supermarket know what to label 'lemons'? They 
place an order to the fruit distributor indicating they want to buy 
'lemons.' How does the distributor know? They buy from the farmers 
who grow lemons. How does the farmer know? He buys lemon seeds to 
grow lemon trees from an  agricultural supplier. If we continue following 
this chain, we eventually arrive at  the advice of botanical science, whch 
we take to be authoritative. 
The point is that many of our concepts are not understood by each of 
us individually, but rather through a complex social network. As Putnam 
remarks, we tend to think of words as tools, but many are not like hand 
tools that we use individually, but rather are more like an ocean liner 
that requires a crew of hundreds for its operation. 
In the example of 'lemon,' the social network led to a certain scien- 
tific authority, the botanist, who is assumed to know all there is to know 
about lemons. We seem to regard science as the base authority for most 
of the terms used for physical and biological phenomena. 
This is not the case for psychological and social phenomena. Many of 
us are skeptical that 'intelligence' is what an IQ test measures. Nor do we 
easily accept the psychophysics definition of 'anxiety' as Galvanic Skin 
Response. 
More relevant to the activities of commercial organizations are 
terms for mundane, social artifacts. For instance, consider the concept 
'chair.' What definitions are available? Consider examples like office 
chairs, an over-stuffed easy chair, beach chairs, bean-bag chairs, etc. 
Perhaps the only common characteristic is that we sit on them. But then 
consider what you sit on during a picnic or while visiting a house in Japan. 
What counts as a chair, it seems, depends much more on social con- 
text than on any physical characteristics of chairs. It is closely tied to 
the sociology of sitting, which we each learned through a long accultura- 
tion process. Further, the concept of chair is only partially known to 
each of us, and probably has a larger and different concept for each 
social aggregate we examine, (e.g., the concept chair in New York vs 
Tokyo vs Europe, etc.) Further, the concept is constantly changing. 
Indeed, the marketing strategy of certain furniture design companies 
depends on extending and altering our conception of 'chair.' 
If we are persuaded by t h s  view of semantics, then we are forced to 
admit to an eventual limitation to the technological promises of produc- 
tion systems, logical databases, and logic programming. 
We tend to underestimate the magnitude of the semantic problem, 
particularly as regards terms describing objects and phenomena in the 
social sphere. (And it is these aspects that are of primary concern to 
most organirstions.) 
Organizations, as sub-cultures, represent an intermediate case 
between the individual's understanding of these terms, and the under- 
standing of the society at large. However, it is based on a dual member- 
ship of individuals, in the organization and in the society, that the organi- 
zation itself maintains an effective relationshp with its social environ- 
ment. Computer systems are not likely to duplicate the mechanisms by 
which we adapt our language unless they too attain a similar social 
membership. Only then can they learn why, for instance, "ring around 
the collar" implies embarrassment at  cocktail parties). 
J. CONCLUDING RE116ARKIi: THE THIRD WAVE SCENARIO 
Referring to the two dimensional taxonomy (complexity vs uncer- 
tainty) discussed earlier, Jay Galbraith (1973, 1977) observes that 
hierarchcal management structures tend to be oriented towards aspects 
of the organization's activities which present the greatest uncertainty. 
Thus a manufacturing company, where technology is dynamic, will tend to 
have a functional organization, whereas an insurance company will prob- 
ably have divisions based on customer type (reflecting dynamic insurance 
needs). Organizations which face hlgh uncertainty in multiple aspects 
may find it useful to adapt a matrix type of organization with dual hierar- 
chies. For example, a computer manufacturer might have management 
hierarchies based on technological aspects and another herarchy based 
on customer differentiation. 
In these cases, the lower level operating departments have two sets 
of superiors in the authority structure and often are in an arbitrating role 
rather than a strictly subordinate one. 
In The Third Wave, Toffler (1960) creates a fascinating scenario 
which carries t h s  trend to the level of economic organization. The first 
wave ' economic' structure of primitive societies is mainly agrarian, with 
largely manual and animal technology. Population is limited to small vil- 
lages that are economically self-dependent. Production and consumption 
are closely associated. 
The 'second wave' is characterized by heavy industrialization. 
Economies of scale lead to the formation of large, centralized organiza- 
tions, and, as a consequence, population concentrations in large cities. 
Statistical, mass marketing becomes the link between producer and con- 
sumer. 
We are now, says Toffler, entering into the transition from industrial 
society to a new, 'third wave.' As  material demands become satiated with 
cheap manufactured goods, other social and environmental factors take 
on increased importance. We become concerned about pollution and 
destructive alterations to the environment. Product safety and the qual- 
ity of food and drugs become issues. We begin to resent living in noisy, 
crowded cities and working in large, impersonal work environments. Spe- 
cial interest groups form around each of these themes and each exerts 
its own political/economic pressures. To respond to the wide, dynamic 
variations in demand, organizations 'un-bundle' their products and opera- 
tions and become de-centralized, loosely-connected systems. 
This permits demographc shifts back to smaller, more human-sized 
villages. But these are not the isolated villages of the first wave, but 
rather are inter-connected in a large social network. 
Interestingly, the key factor that Toffler sees to enable this transi- 
tion is information technology. Small-scale, custom manufacturing 
becomes possible through flexible automation. Geographical de- 
centralization is supported by tele-work and electronic networks. Educa- 
tion and research advance through electronic libraries, computer-aided 
instruction and expert systems. The Japanese seem to have a similar 
scenario in mind in their development plans for '5th generation' comput- 
ing technology (Moto-oka 1981). 
The world of the t h r d  wave is an attractive one. I t  portrays the relief 
of numerous social tensions and anxieties not only for technologically 
advanced countries but for developing countries as well. It does however 
place a tremendous import and responsibility on issues raised in this 
paper, particularly on the semantic problems discussed in the last sec- 
tion. 
An organization may define (hence fix) its terms to suit its special 
interests, and construct complex information systems based on that 
vocabulary. As discussed, the continued use of the information system 
relies on the permanence and stability of these definitions, so that the 
use of the technology results, ultimately, in a trade-off much like that of 
bureaucratic rationalization. By fixing its language, the technology aids 
in coping with complexity (including foreseeable variations) but loses its 
usefulness as the organization is confronted by unexpected and surpris- 
ing phenomena. 
The problem is all the worse in the inter-connected society predicted 
by the t h r d  wave scenario. Here the request is for technologies that not 
only aid in the management of complexity, and are adaptable but must 
also be compatible with a number of over-lapping organizational/societal 
hierarches. 
The suggestions here have been that the new technologies promised 
by artificial intelligence research will indeed by an important factor. But 
they will not be the only factor in the Brave New World of the Thrd  Wave. 
The limits to information technology are bounded by the limits of bureau- 
cratic rationalization. 
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